EXTENSION OF TIME IN CERTAIN CASES :
Doctrine of sufficient cause
Section 5 allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay which is embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
It is clarified by the explanation appended to the Section 5 that the fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgement of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.
Thus, the Court may admit an application or appeal even after the expiry of the specified period of limitation if it is satisfied with the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be as to sufficient cause for not making it within time.
The Section is not applicable to applications made under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also to suits. The Court has no power to admit a time barred suit even if there is a sufficient cause for the delay. It applies only to appeals or applications as specified therein. The reason for non-applicability of the Section to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits extends from 3 to 12 years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6 months. For the applicability of Section 5, the “prescribed period” should be over. The prescribed period means any period prescribed by any law for the time being in force.
The party applying for condonation of delay should satisfy the Court for not making an appeal or application within the prescribed period for sufficient cause. The term sufficient cause has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It depends on the circumstances of each case.
However, it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, the Supreme Court held that once the period of limitation expires then the appellant has to explain the delay made thereafter for day by day and if he is unable to explain the delay even for a single day, it would be deemed that the party did not have sufficient cause for delay.
It is the Court’s discretion to extend or not to extend the period of limitation even after the sufficient cause has been shown and other conditions are also specified. However, the Court should exercise its discretion judicially and not arbitrarily.
What is sufficient cause and what is not may be explained by the following Judicial observations:
1. Wrong practice of High Court which misled the appellant or his counsel in not filing the appeal should be regarded as sufficient cause under Section 5;
2. In certain cases, mistake of counsel may be taken into consideration in condonation of delay. But such mistake must be bona fide;
3. Wrong advice given by advocate can give rise to sufficient cause in certain cases;
4. Mistake of law in establishing or exercising the right given by law may be considered as sufficient cause. However, ignorance of law is not excuse, nor the negligence of the party or the legal adviser constitutes a sufficient cause;
5. Imprisonment of the party or serious illness of the party may be considered for condonation of delay;
6. Time taken for obtaining certified copies of the decree of the judgment necessary to accompany the appeal or application was considered for condoning the delay.
7. Non-availability of the file of the case to the State counsel or Panel lawyer is no ground for condonation of inordinate delay (Collector and Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Darshan Singh and others, AIR 1999 Raj. 84).
8. Ailment of father during which period the defendant was looking after him has been held to be a sufficient and genuine cause (Mahendra Yadav v. Ratna Devi & others, AIR 2006 (NOC) 339 Pat.
The quasi-judicial tribunals, labour courts or executive authorities have no power to extend the period under this Section.
There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such.